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Abstract 
This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. 
Aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk are assessed under two monetary 
regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). These effects differ because 
IT implies base-level drift in the price level, while PT makes the price level stationary around 
a target price path. Under IT, the welfare cost of long run inflation risk is equal to 0.35 per 
cent of aggregate consumption. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, 
it is lowered to only 0.01 per cent. There are welfare gains from PT because it raises average 
consumption for the young and lowers consumption risk substantially for the old. These 
results are strongly robust to changes in the PT target horizon and fairly robust to imperfect 
credibility, fiscal policy, and model calibration. While the distributional effects of an 
unexpected transition to PT are sizeable, they are short-lived and not welfare-reducing.  
Keywords: inflation targeting, price-level targeting, inflation risk, monetary policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The payoffs on many long-term contracts are fixed in nominal terms. Consequently, 
unanticipated changes in inflation that are not reversed lead to fluctuations in real wealth. 
Such fluctuations are important for retirees, since they must fund their consumption in old 
age using wealth accumulated in long-term nominal assets like pensions and bonds. Inflation 
risk also has implications for younger generations because it raises the average cost of issuing 
nominal government debt by the ‘inflation risk premium’,2 increasing the level of taxes 
needed to finance a given level of government expenditure, or lowering the amount of 
government expenditure that can be funded from a given tax take. These aggregate effects 
could be important for two reasons. First, the amount of wealth accumulated in long-term 
nominal assets in developed economies is substantial (Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Meh and 
Terajima, 2008). Second, since many central banks have adopted formal inflation targets, 
inflation risk over a long horizon can be non-trivial even if yearly deviations from the 
inflation target are small, because there is base-level drift in the price level.
3
 Assessing these 
aggregate effects speaks to the need for a careful general equilibrium analysis that takes into 
account the major effects of long run inflation risk, including those for government finances.     
In this paper, an analysis of this kind is conducted using a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model. In particular, aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation 
risk are assessed under two different monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and 
price-level targeting (PT). The main difference between these two regimes is that IT ignores 
unanticipated shocks to the price level, while PT offsets them. Specifically, a PT regime aims 
to return the price level to a target path for prices that is known ex ante. The price level is 
thus trend-stationary and can be predicted with much greater certainty at long horizons, so 
that long run inflation risk is largely eliminated by a PT regime. Given the prevalence of 
long-term nominal contracts in developed economies, assessing the aggregate and welfare 
effects of long run inflation risk is important for comparing IT and PT regimes. In recent 
years, both academics and policymakers have become interested in this comparison.               
By contrast to IT, a PT regime has never been implemented in practice.
4
 However, several 
papers have shown that PT offers short-term stabilisation benefits over IT when agents are 
forward-looking. Vestin (2006), for example, shows that in the standard New Keynesian 
model, PT reduces inflation variability for a given level of output gap variability when policy 
is discretionary. In the same model, the optimal commitment policy implies a stationary price 
level (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) and is therefore consistent with a PT mandate.
5
 In 
addition to this literature, the Bank of Canada recently conducted a detailed review of PT (see 
Bank of Canada, 2011) and has contributed a large body of research to the literature, mainly 
from forward-looking models calibrated to the Canadian economy.
6
 To date, however, no 
                                                          
2
 For a recent survey of the inflation risk premium, see Bekaert and Wang (2010).  
3
 That is, the price level follows a random walk. Inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon in this case 
because inflation between period t and t+k depends on the ratio of the price level in t+k to that in period t.  
4
 Berg and Jonung (1999) argue that PT was adopted in Sweden during the Great Depression, but this is 
disputed by Straumann and Woitek (2009). 
5
 The issue of whether optimal policy in the New Keynesian model implies base drift is controversial. Negative 
results include Steinsson (2003), Levin et al. (2010) and Amano, Ambler and Shukayev (forthcoming).  
6
 This work is surveyed in Ambler (2009), Crawford, Meh and Terajima (2009) and Bank of Canada (2011).   
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paper has assessed the aggregate and welfare effects of IT and PT in a DSGE model in which 
long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. The main contribution of this paper is to 
provide a first assessment of this kind. 
An overlapping generations (OG) model with money is calibrated to roughly match the 
portfolios of UK retirees. The model has three features that make it useful for assessing 
aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk. First, long run inflation risk matters 
for social welfare because young generations hold long-term nominal bonds – whose payoff 
is revalued by unanticipated inflation – in order to provide for old age when they are retired. 
By contrast, only short-term inflation risk matters for social welfare in the standard New 
Keynesian model (Woodford, 2003). Second, in an OG framework the effects of long run 
inflation risk on young and old generations can be assessed directly, hence providing useful 
information on the distributional effects of monetary policy. Third, the life-cycle setup of the 
OG model, where each period lasts between 20 and 30 years, allows one to parsimoniously 
model inflation risk and equilibrium asset prices over a long horizon without introducing a 
large number of additional state variables.
7
 In sensitivity analysis, the model is calibrated for 
nominal portfolios in Canada as a check on the importance of portfolio structure and, 
subsequently, for Canadian price level shocks in order to estimate the aggregate and welfare 
effects of long run inflation risk in Canada.        
Key findings are as follows. Under IT, the welfare cost of long run inflation risk is substantial 
at 0.35 per cent of aggregate consumption. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely 
eliminated, the welfare cost is reduced to only 0.01 per cent, implying a permanent welfare 
gain from PT of 0.34 per cent. PT increases social welfare because it lowers consumption risk 
substantially for old generations and raises average consumption by the young. Consumption 
risk for old generations is lower under PT because reducing long run inflation risk stabilises 
the real payoff on nominal retirement assets held by consumers. This effect accounts for 
around one-quarter of the total welfare gain. At the same time, PT raises average 
consumption by the young since a fall in long run inflation risk lowers the inflation risk 
premium on nominal government debt,
8
 so that the same long run level of government 
spending as under IT can be maintained with lower taxes, hence raising disposable income. 
Since this latter effect accounts for three-quarters of the total welfare gain from PT, the 
analysis clearly highlights the importance of a general equilibrium approach that takes into 
account higher-order effects of inflation risk, including those for government finances.
9
  
Although PT raises social welfare, its aggregate effects are not unambiguously positive. The 
old benefit from a reduction in consumption risk of more than one-tenth under PT, but 
consumption risk rises for the young, albeit only marginally. Moreover, average consumption 
by old generations falls non-trivially under PT, although the magnitude of this reduction is 
lower than the rise in average consumption for the young, so that each unborn generation can 
expect higher lifetime consumption under PT. These results are of interest from a 
distributional perspective since they suggest that the current old generation might lose out in 
                                                          
7
 In the New Keynesian model, for example, it would be necessary build up the term-structures of real and 
nominal interest rates over many quarters to match a 30-year holding horizon (as in the model here). To do so 
would require many additional state variables, making a large number of stochastic simulations infeasible.  
8
 Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) report that a PT regime essentially eliminates the term premium on 10-year 
nominal bonds in a DSGE model, due to the reduction in long run inflation risk it engenders.    
9
 Failure to account for higher-order effects of risk can lead to spurious welfare reversals (Kim and Kim, 2003).  
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a transition from IT to PT. However, formal analysis of unexpected transitions from IT to PT 
indicates that all generations alive at the time of the transition – including the current old – 
can expect to gain in utility terms from a switch in regime to PT.   
Returning to long run impacts, several extensions of the baseline model were made to test 
robustness. First, if the price level is returned to its target path gradually over several years, 
most of the long run inflation risk present under IT is still eliminated, so that both the welfare 
gain and aggregate effects of PT are strongly robust. Second, the welfare gain from PT is 
reduced, but still quantitatively non-trivial, if there is a moderate or high degree of imperfect 
credibility. The reason is that the belief that policy may revert to IT raises the inflation risk 
premium on nominal government debt, so that taxes must be raised to maintain the same long 
run level of government spending. In turn, this leads to lower consumption by the young than 
in the perfect credibility case. Third, the assumption that the government sets taxes to meet a 
long run government spending target was relaxed in favour of a specification where fiscal 
policy equalises taxes across regimes but provides public goods valued by households. In this 
case the welfare gain from PT was somewhat lower, though still non-trivial, at around one-
third of the baseline estimate, or 0.1 per cent of aggregate consumption. The extensions with 
respect to imperfect credibility and fiscal policy thus suggest that the baseline quantitative 
estimates should be treated with some caution.  
Formal sensitivity analysis was split into two parts. First, sensitivity of the baseline results 
was tested by varying individual calibrated parameters. This analysis shows that the welfare 
gain from PT is quite sensitive to household risk aversion, the share of indexed government 
debt, and the extent of nominal risk, being higher in economies with greater risk aversion, 
less indexed debt and more nominal risk. Second, the model was calibrated for nominal 
portfolios in Canada, where nominal assets play a more important role in retirement income 
than in the UK. The results suggest that a shift towards Canadian portfolios in the UK would 
raise the welfare gains from PT substantially, from 0.34 to 0.64 per cent of aggregate 
consumption. However, when this model is additionally calibrated to match the lower 
magnitude of Canadian price level shocks over the IT period, the aggregate and welfare 
effects of long run inflation risk are similar to those in the UK. Consequently, the potential 
long run welfare gains from PT are likely to be broadly similar in the UK and Canada.  
The analysis in this paper is also related to literature on the aggregate effects of unanticipated 
inflation. In a seminal paper, Doepke and Schneider (2006) document nominal portfolios in 
the US and show that an unanticipated increase in inflation has substantial redistributional 
effects through revaluations of nominal assets and liabilities. Subsequently, Meh and 
Terajima (2008) examined nominal portfolios in Canada. Building on these two papers, Meh, 
Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010) simulate aggregate and welfare effects from one-off episodes 
of unanticipated inflation in Canada under IT and PT. They find that unanticipated inflation 
has greater redistribution effects under IT because the initial change in inflation is not 
reversed, so that long-term nominal contracts undergo substantial revaluations. Consequently, 
induced welfare losses are somewhat larger under IT. However, an important limitation with 
their welfare analysis is that they consider only one-off shocks to inflation, not all possible 
realizations.
10
 Since the current paper rectifies this limitation, it should provide additional 
insight into the welfare effects of PT in Canada through the nominal portfolio channel.     
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 That is, they consider individual draws from the distribution of shocks and not the entire distribution. As 
noted by Meh et al., the latter is necessary to account for the impact of higher-order moments on social welfare.   
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains how it is used to 
assess the welfare cost of long run inflation risk. Section 3 describes monetary policy. In 
Section 4 the model is calibrated, and in Section 5 baseline simulation results are reported. 
Section 6 presents extensions relating to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility, and 
fiscal policy. Section 7 conducts a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
2. Model 
The model has three sectors: a household sector, a government sector, and a sector devoted to 
production of a single output good. Each sector is explained in detail below, beginning with 
the household sector. This section also describes the aggregate resource constraint and the 
relationship between the preferences of individual generations and social welfare. 
2.1 Consumers 
A simple overlapping generations (OG) model with two generations is considered. Each 
generation is modelled as a representative consumer. These generations inelastically supply a 
unit of labour when young and retire in the second period when old, leaving no bequests to 
future generations. Let the subscripts {Y,O} denote, respectively, the young and the old. Each 
period in the model lasts 30 years in order to match a plausible holding horizon for long-term 
assets such as pensions. There is no population growth, and the number of generations per 
period is constant and normalized to 1. The real wage income of each young generation is 
taxed by the government at a constant rate, τ. Young agents have access to four assets: 
indexed government bonds, b
i
; nominal government bonds, b
n
; capital, k; and money, m. 
Indexed government bonds and capital are real assets whose payoff is not affected by 
unanticipated inflation. By contrast, the payoffs on nominal government bonds and money – 
the two nominal assets in the model – are revalued by unanticipated changes in inflation.   
When young, each generation consumes and chooses a portfolio of assets, z ≡ (k, bi, bn, m), to 
enable them to consume in old age when retired. Capital earns a real gross rate of return r
k
,
 
which is taxed by the government at rate τk. Government bonds are in positive net supply. 
Indexed bonds pay a riskless real return of r
f
, and nominal bonds a riskless nominal return R, 
both of which are endogenous. These returns ensure that, for each type of bond, demand is 
equated to the supply set by the government.
 
Indexed bonds are a riskless real asset, whereas 
nominal bonds are riskless but for unanticipated inflation over the 30-year holding horizon 
from youth to old age. Money pays zero interest, implying a real gross return r
m 
=
 
1/(1+π), 
where π is the rate of inflation between youth and old age (i.e. over a 30-year horizon). A 
positive demand for money results from a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint which requires 
young agents to hold real money balances of at least δ > 0, so that mt ≥ δ as in Champ and 
Freeman (1990). The main advantage of this constraint is that it provides a role for money 
without requiring that it offer explicit transactions services, thereby ensuring that differences 
in welfare under IT and PT are attributable to long run inflation risk and not transactions 
services derived from money. 
 
The CIA constraint binds with equality if Rt > 1 for all t, which 
was comfortably satisfied in all numerical simulations reported in this paper.
11
 Let rn ≡ 
R/(1+π) denote the real return on nominal bonds. 
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 This condition is derived in the Technical Appendix (see section B). 
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Mathematically, the budget constraints faced by generations alive in period t are given by 
t
n
t
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tttYt mbbkwc   111, )1(                                (1) 
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where (1) is the budget constraint of the young, and (2) is the budget constraint of the old.
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Given the focus in this paper, it is crucial to specify consumer preferences that can potentially 
match some of the main features of household attitudes to risk highlighted in empirical 
research. As is well known, standard CRRA preferences cannot match risk premia and the 
risk-free rate, because they imply that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is the 
reciprocal of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Consequently, Epstein and Zin (1989, 
1991) and Weil (1989) preferences are used here. These preferences have the advantage that 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion can be 
calibrated separately. In a recent paper, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) show that this 
feature enables an otherwise standard New Keynesian model to match the term premium on 
nominal bonds without compromising its ability to fit key macroeconomic variables.   
Consumers solve a maximisation problem of the form 
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where 0 < β < 1 is households’ discount factor, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
and 1/(1–ε) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
The first-order conditions are summarized by the following Euler equations: 
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 The return r
f 
 is dated in period t-1 because it is known by consumers when they save for old age. The real 
return on nominal bonds r
n
 is dated in period t because it is not known at the time consumers save for old age. 
Capital and bonds are dated t+1 but are decided at the end of period t, before shocks in period t+1 are realized. 
13
 Here t
~
 is the ratio of the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint to that on the young’s budget constraint. 
For a full derivation of consumers’ first-order conditions, see section A of the Technical Appendix. 
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2.2 Firms 
The production sector of the economy consists of a representative firm which produces 
output using a production function with constant returns to scale. The firm hires capital and 
labour in competitive markets to maximise current period profits, taking the wage rate and 
capital rental rate as given. Total factor productivity, A, is stochastic and follows an AR(1) 
process in logs. The production function is Cobb-Douglas, with the share of capital in output 
equal to α and the labour share equal to 1 – α.   
The real wage and the return on capital are thus given by 
   1)1( ttt
k
ttt kAkryw                    (8) 
 1/   tttt
k
t kAkyr                     (9) 
2.3 Government 
The government performs three functions. First, to meet government spending commitments, 
it taxes wage income of the young at a constant rate τ > 0, and capital income of the old at a 
constant rate τk > 0. Second, it sets the total supply of government bonds. Third, the 
government conducts monetary policy by committing to an IT or PT money supply rule. 
The government budget constraint is given by 
 111   t
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The total supply of government bonds is b = b
i
 + b
n
, and the shares of indexed and nominal 
government bonds in the total bond portfolio are constant and equal to v and 1–v, 
respectively.
14
 Since the tax rates on wage income and capital are constant, it follows that τk = 
aτ for some finite constant a > 0.  
The government budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as 
11 ])1([)(   t
m
ttt
n
t
i
ttt
k
ttt mrmbrvvrbkarwg                    (11) 
 
Since there are no social transfers in the model, it is assumed that the government sets the 
total supply of government bonds to facilitate consumption smoothing between youth and old 
age. In particular, it chooses the total supply of government debt so that β-1Et(sdft+1) = 1, 
which implies that the marginal utility of consumption when young is equated to the expected 
(undiscounted) marginal utility of consumption when old. This assumption implies perfect 
consumption smoothing in the deterministic steady-state and (hence) a steady-state real 
interest rate 1/β. 15 Consequently, there is a degree of social insurance in the model without 
the burden of explicitly modelling a social security system.   
                                                          
14
 The share of indexed bonds is calibrated to match data. Alternatively, the indexation share could be chosen 
optimally. This approach was not taken here because the aim is to assess the aggregate and welfare effects of 
long run inflation risk, not the way in which fiscal/debt policy could mitigate this risk.    
15
 This assumption ensures that the gross real return on government bonds exceeds 1 and that the bond supply is 
stationary. Consequently, the standard transversality condition on government debt will be satisfied.   
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The government sets the nominal money supply according to an IT or PT rule. These policy 
rules are discussed in Section 3. Subject to the monetary rule implemented and the 
equilibrium conditions of the model, the government sets the constant tax rate τ to ensure that 
it achieves a given long run target ratio of government spending to output, or E(gt/yt) = G* > 
0, where E is the unconditional expectations operator.
16
 Although τ is constant over time, it 
will generally differ under IT and PT because the level of long run inflation risk affects the 
average real return on money balances and the inflation risk premium on nominal 
government debt. It should thus be understood that the tax rate is regime-specific, though this 
dependence is suppressed in order to minimize notational burden.      
2.4 Social welfare 
Welfare is given by the socially-discounted sum of lifetime utilities across all generations:
17
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where 0<ω<1 is the social discount factor, and E is the unconditional expectations operator. 
The welfare gain from eliminating long run inflation risk is computed as the fractional 
increase in aggregate consumption, λ, necessary to equate social welfare under inflation risk 
with that when inflation is constant and equal to target (as denoted by the * superscript):    
 *)1( 1 UU                       (13) 
It is clear from (12) and (13) that the social discount factor will not affect λ. Consequently, 
uncertainty about the correct calibration is not an issue for the welfare results reported here.  
2.5 Aggregate resource constraint 
Capital depreciates fully within a period, an assumption which is empirically reasonable 
given that each period in the model lasts 30 years. It follows that investment in period t is it = 
kt+1. The economy’s aggregate resource constraint in period t is thus yt = ct,Y  +  ct,O + kt+1 + gt, 
where the sum of the first two terms on the right hand side is aggregate consumption. 
3. Monetary Policy 
The government conducts monetary policy via money supply rules, which are set yearly with 
annual inflation in mind. The government can commit to these rules but cannot control the 
money supply perfectly and so has imperfect control over inflation. In order to obtain IT and 
PT money supply rules consistent with the 30-year horizon of the model, the long run 
implications of these annual rules are traced out over a 30-year horizon. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Since there is a strong theoretical case for smoothing taxes (see Barro (1979)) but not government spending, a 
risk-neutral attitude to government spending (i.e. a concern for the mean but not volatility) seems justified.   
17
 The social welfare function ignores the utility of the initial old, but the impact of a transition from IT to PT on 
the current old generation is investigated in section 5.2. 
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3.1 Inflation targeting (IT)  
Under IT, the yearly nominal money supply grows at the annual target inflation rate, π*, plus 
any deviation due to an exogenous money supply shock ε: 
   )1*)(1(1 nnn MM                                                                  (14) 
where Mn  is the nominal money stock at the end of year n, εn is an IID-normal random 
variable with mean zero and variance σ2.  
By substituting repeatedly for the previous year’s money supply, the money supply rule in 
(14) can be expressed as follows:  
 

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n
nj
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30 )1(*)1(                                                                             (15) 
It is clear from this equation that the IT money rule in (14) aims at a constant inflation target 
and does not attempt to offset past money supply shocks – i.e. ‘bygones are bygones’. Given 
that each period in the model lasts 30 years and the nominal money supply is the end-of-
period stock of money, the implied money supply rule in any period t is 
 
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 
30
1
,
30
1 )1(*)1(
j
tjtt MM                   (16) 
where the money supply innovations are indexed by the year j = 1,2,…,30 of period t in 
which they occur, and Mt  ≡ Ptmt is the nominal stock of money in period t. 
Since mt = δ by the CIA constraint, the money supply rule in (16) implies that inflation is 
period t is given by
18
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It is clear from (17) that there is base-level drift in the price level under IT: each yearly 
money supply shock has a permanent impact on the price level. As a result, inflation risk 
accumulates over a 30-year horizon. Note that in the absence of money supply innovations 
(i.e. εj,t = 0 for all j and t), this money supply rule would stabilise inflation perfectly at the 
long-term inflation target, (1+π*)30, consistent with annual inflation of π* every year. 
Finally, note that inflation expectations are anchored at the inflation target under IT: 
 301 *)1(1    ttE                    (18) 
where Et-1 is the expectation conditional on information at the end of period t-1. 
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 In particular, Mt = Ptmt implies that if mt = δ, then Mt/Mt-1= Pt/Pt-1 ≡ 1+πt, by money market equilibrium. 
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3.2 Price-level targeting (PT) 
Under PT, policy aims to stabilize the price level around a long run target price path that is 
known ex ante and whose slope is consistent with an annual inflation target of π*. The crucial 
difference relative to IT is that past deviations from the yearly inflation target are offset in 
order to return the price level to its target path. The yearly money supply rule thus includes a 
correction for the previous year’s shock:19 
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where Mn  is the nominal money stock at the end of year n, εn is an IID-normal random 
variable with mean zero and variance σ2.                                                           
By substituting repeatedly for the previous year’s money supply, the money supply rule in 
(19) can be expressed as follows:  
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This equation implies a money supply rule in period t of the form 
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where ε30,t is the money supply innovation in year 30 of period t.  
By the binding CIA constraint, the implied period-t inflation rate is 
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In contrast to IT, the PT money supply rule prevents base-level drift: past money supply 
shocks have only a temporary impact on the price level.
20
 Intuitively, inflation in period t 
depends on the money supply shock in year 30 of period t because policy offsets money 
supply shocks with a one-year lag and so cannot offset the shock in year 30 until the first year 
of the next period. Inflation in period t also depends on the money supply shock in year 30 of 
period t–1, because this shock must be offset in year 1 of period t to correct for the previous 
deviation from the target price path (i.e. the deviation in the final year of period t-1). 
Since rational agents expect past deviations from the target price path to be offset, inflation 
expectations vary around the inflation target with the past money supply innovation: 
                                                          
19
 The economic intuition can be seen more easily by taking logs: Mn ≈ Mn-1 + π* + εn  – εn-1. 
20
 It should be clear from a comparison of (17) and (22) that long run inflation risk is substantially higher under 
IT. The Technical Appendix (section C) derives analytical approximations for the two variance expressions 
which imply that the inflation variance is approximately 15 times higher under IT. 
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4. Model calibration 
The main assets in UK retirement portfolios are classified as nominal or real assets, with 
nominal assets defined as those that are denominated in UK pounds and less than fully 
indexed to inflation. The model is calibrated in order to roughly match the shares of real and 
nominal assets in retirement portfolios over the IT period.
21
 Where specific data is drawn 
upon, 2005 is used as the reference year. Free parameters in the model are calibrated to match 
standard values in the literature. 
4.1 Retirement portfolios in the UK  
Evidence on UK retirement portfolios is provided by the Pensioners’ Incomes Series (PIS), 
published by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). The PIS provides information 
on the sources of pensioner incomes from the Family Resources Survey. In the PIS, 
pensioners are defined as those of state pension age. 
The primary source of pensioner incomes is state benefits, consisting primarily of the Basic 
and Additional state pension. In the 2004/5 PIS, state benefits accounted for around 45 per 
cent of pensioner incomes (DWP 2009, Table 2.1). Both the Basic and Additional state 
pensions are currently indexed under a triple-lock system (i.e. the highest of earnings, 
inflation or 2.5 per cent), and prior to this they were indexed to inflation with a 2.5 per cent 
floor. State pensions are therefore classified as nominal assets, except that one-fifth of state 
pension income is assumed to be fully indexed. The second most important source of 
pensioner incomes is occupational pensions, including those ‘contracted out’ into private 
pension schemes and public sector pensions. Occupational pensions accounted for around 26 
per cent of pensioner incomes in 2004/5 PIS. For calibration purposes, it is assumed that 
occupational pensions are split in the ratio 50:50 between the public and private sector.
22
 
Private sector pensions are classified as real assets since equities are the most popular asset 
class in which UK pension funds invest, with a portfolio allocation share of around 40 per 
cent in 2005, compared to a share of government bonds and bills of less than 12 per cent (see 
OECD 2009, Table 2.10).
23
 Public sector pensions are classified as nominal since they are 
primarily defined benefit, but it is assumed that one-fifth of public sector pension income is 
fully indexed to reflect indexation provisions in practice.
24
 
The remainder of pensioner incomes in 2004/5 is accounted for by investment income of 
around 10 per cent, personal pensions of around 3 per cent, and earnings from employment 
and self-employment of around 15 per cent (DWP, 2009). Personal pensions and investment 
income are treated as real assets. Since the closest counterpart to earnings from employment 
and self-employment in the model is the return on capital, earnings are treated as a real asset 
                                                          
21
 The model’s nominal assets are nominal bonds and money, whereas indexed bonds and capital are real assets. 
22
 The actual UK ratio is around 60:40, but a long-standing government objective is to change this to 40:60. 
23
 Equities had the highest share at 37 per cent, followed by Mutual Funds at 19.8 per cent. The corporate bonds 
share is around 8 per cent, but inflation uncertainty is unlikely to be the main source of risk on such bonds.   
24
 Public sector pensions are currently indexed to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) with an 8-month lag. 
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for the purpose of calibration.
25
 Overall, the data above suggest a target ratio of nominal 
assets to real assets of around 1. Calibration is discussed in the next two subsections. 
4.2 Aggregate uncertainty 
The model contains two aggregate shocks: a money supply disturbance and a total factor 
productivity shock. These disturbances are calibrated in this subsection. First, calibrating the 
money supply rules requires a standard deviation for the annual money supply shock. This 
standard deviation was set at σ = 0.0105, which is close to the standard deviation of annual 
CPI inflation from 1997 to 2011 in data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
Calibrating the model standard deviation in this way should enable the model to match the 
amount of long run inflation risk that would be observed with typical price level shocks under 
an IT regime that permits base-level drift, consistent the mandates of IT central banks.
26, 27
    
The productivity shock was also calibrated for a generational horizon of 30 years. Its 
calibration was based on the 30-year properties implied by a standard annual productivity 
process. In particular, if the log of annual productivity follows an AR(1) with a correlation 
coefficient ρ and IID-normal innovation en with standard deviation σn, then (by repeated 
substitution) log productivity at a generational frequency of 30 years will equal 
ttAmeanAt eAAA  1lnln)1(ln                                 (24) 
where ρA ≡ ρ
30
 and 



30
1
)1(
1
j
jn
j
t ee  . 
The mean productivity parameter Amean was normalised to 1. The AR(1) coefficient ρA was set 
equal to 0.20, based on an annual serial correlation coefficient ρ = 0.9478, which is similar to 
standard calibrations for annual productivity in the business cycle literature.
28
 Based on the 
expression for et and the IID assumption, the implied innovation standard deviation at a 
generational frequency is σe = [(1 – ρ
60
)/(1 – ρ2)]1/2σn. Accordingly, σe was set equal to 
0.0553, consistent with an annual productivity innovation standard deviation of σn = 0.018. 
The latter is similar to the standard calibrations in the literature and matches the standard 
deviation of annual UK TFP growth from 1998-2010 based on data from the ONS.
29
  
 
                                                          
25
 Recall that old generations are retired and so receive no income from employment. 
26
 Note that annualised inflation, i.e. (1+π)1/30,  has a standard deviation that is approximately equal to σ under an 
IT regime (provided that π* is sufficiently small).    
27
 The variance of actual inflation at a 30-year horizon cannot be used since IT was not adopted as part of an 
independent regime in the UK until 1997. Some economists have argued that monetary policy in some IT 
economies appears to have been closer to PT, but the dynamics of the price level in these economies could be 
due to ‘good luck’ – i.e. offsetting disturbances. Ultimately, there is not enough data to make a conclusive 
judgement at the current time.   
28
 This calibration implies only a small amount of persistence in productivity at a generational frequency, but 
there does not seem to be any strong evidence of positive serial correlation at long horizons. 
29
 If the log of annual productivity follows an AR(1) process, then the variance of annual productivity growth 
will be approximately equal to the innovation variance provided that (ρ – 1)2 ≈ 0. Section D of the Technical 
Appendix provides a formal demonstration of this result. 
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4.3 Model parameter calibration 
Given that this paper concentrates on the implications of long run inflation risk for 
households, it is important that preference parameters reflect real-world attitudes toward risk 
and intertemporal substitution. It is also important that the model give sensible portfolio 
shares to nominal and real assets and realistic GDP shares to key macroeconomic variables. 
Preference parameters 
The preference parameters in the model are ε (which determines the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (1–ε)–1), the discount factor β, and the risk aversion coefficient γ. 
The parameter ε was set equal to –0.35, implying an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 
0.74. This calibrated value is close to that in the OG model of Olovsson (2010) and is 
consistent with micro studies that estimate an elasticity of intertemporal substitution below 1. 
The discount factor β was set at 0.70, implying an annual discount factor of 0.988, and hence 
an annual risk-free real rate of 1.2 per cent per annum. The risk-free real rate was deliberately 
set below the average UK estimate of 2.9 per cent per annum for the period 1965 to 2005 (see 
Mills, 2008). The reason is that matching a real rate this high gives an investment to GDP 
ratio that is somewhat lower than in the data. Finally, taking the calibrated values of ε, β and 
other model parameters as given (see below), γ was set in order to match the Sharpe ratio on 
capital, or E[r
k–rf]/std(rk–rf).30 The target value in calibration was set at 0.43 based on the 
results in Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002), who estimate the Sharpe ratio using 
20-year holding period real returns on equity and bonds in the US. Accordingly, the risk 
aversion coefficient γ was set at 15, which gives a Sharpe ratio of 0.42. 
Other model parameters 
The production function parameter α was set at 0.263, implying that the share of capital 
income in GDP is 26.3 per cent. This value is slightly on the low side of standard calibrations 
but helps the model to match a target ratio of long-term government bonds to GDP of around 
10 per cent, which roughly matches the share of long-term government bonds in UK GDP 
over the past decade.
31
 The tax rate on capital was set at 2.3 times the income tax rate, that is, 
a = 2.3. A substantially higher tax rate on capital is consistent with UK data over the period 
1970-2005: Angelopoulos, Malley and Phillippopoulos (2012) calculate that the average tax 
rate on capital was 0.44, compared to an average tax rate on labour of 0.27. These figures 
imply that capital taxes should be roughly 1.6 times as high as labour taxes, but the higher 
calibrated ratio of 2.3 enables the model to get closer to target ratio for nominal to real assets. 
Consistent with UK data, the tax and production function calibrations imply that income tax 
is the main source of tax revenue.  
There are four additional coefficients that need to be calibrated. First, an annual inflation 
target enters as a constant in both the IT and PT money supply rules. This target was set at 
0.02, consistent with the 2 per cent UK inflation target for the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). 
Second, real money balances are equal to δ by the CIA constraint. The calibration sets δ = 
0.015 so that money balances are around 3 per cent of GDP, consistent with UK data on notes 
and coins (ONS 2011, Table 1). Third, the long run government spending to GDP target, G*, 
                                                          
30
 Returns are annualised in order to calculate the Sharpe ratio. Since capital is taxed, the ratio was computed 
using the after-tax real return on capital.  
31
 See ONS (2011) and historical data available on the Debt Management Office (DMO) website. 
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was set at 0.11 since this implies a tax rate τ in the model solution such that long-term 
government bonds and investment have plausible GDP shares. Finally, the share of indexed 
bonds in the total government bond portfolio, v, was set at 0.20, which is similar to the actual 
UK share of index-linked gilts in 2005 of around one-quarter (DMO, 2005).       
4.4 Model solution and key ratios 
It is crucial that the model give sensible real and nominal asset ratios, since these assets are 
important for the transmission of real and nominal risks. Furthermore, since the risk aversion 
coefficient – an important parameter for welfare – is calibrated to match the Sharpe ratio, it is 
vital that the relative importance of capital income is reasonable. This section discusses the 
performance of the calibrated model against key ratios. 
Table 1 – Target versus model ratios 
Ratio Target Model  Definition 
(b
n 
+ m)/(k+ b
i
) 1.00 0.86 Nominal/real assets 
b/y 0.10 0.11 Long-term bonds/GDP 
b
i
/b 0.25 0.20 Indexation share 
i/y (=k/y) 0.15 0.14 Investment/GDP 
(cY + cO) /y 0.65 0.75 Consumption/GDP 
E[r
k–rf]/std(rk–rf) 0.43 0.42 Sharpe ratio 
m/y 0.03 0.03 Notes and Coins/GDP 
 
In the model, investment equals the capital stock since there is full depreciation. The ratio of 
UK investment to GDP has been close to 15 per cent over the past decade (see ONS 2012, 
Table 1.2). On this basis, the target capital to GDP ratio was set at 0.15. Over the same period 
the consumption share was around 65 per cent. This value is also taken as a target ratio. 
Turning to government debt, bonds have fluctuated somewhat as a percentage of GDP over 
the past decade but have averaged around one-third (see ONS 2011, Table 1.1D). Together 
with a 2005 share of long-term government debt in total government debt of just over 30 per 
cent,
32
 this figure implies a target long-term government bonds to GDP ratio of around 10 per 
cent. Table 1 shows the performance of the calibrated model against these target values.
33
 
Overall, the model does quite well against target ratios. 
 
                                                          
32
 This figure is based on historical data available on the Debt Management Office (DMO) website. The DMO 
classifies gilts as ‘long-term’ if maturity exceeds 15 years. In the model, government bonds are held by 
households. Although households hold only a small fraction of government debt directly, they indirectly own a 
large fraction since pension funds and insurance companies are the main holders of government debt. In 2005, 
such companies held almost 60 per cent of the total stock of government debt (DMO 2010, Chart 11). 
33
 All ratios were calculated using deterministic IT steady-state values, with the exception of the Sharpe ratio. 
The Sharpe ratio was calculated using simulated moments, as described at the start of section 5. 
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5. Baseline results 
This section is split into two parts. The first part investigates the aggregate and welfare 
effects of long run inflation risk under IT and PT. The focus here is on long run regimes, as 
the analysis abstracts entirely from the IT-to-PT transition. The second part then investigates 
an unexpected transition from IT to PT, with a focus on distributional and welfare effects. 
The model was solved using a second-order perturbation approximation in Dynare++ 
(Julliard, 2001).
 
For long run analysis, 500 random simulations were run, each with a 
simulation length of 1100 periods, and with the first 100 periods disregarded to randomise 
initial conditions, leaving a total of 500,000 simulated values to calculate unconditional 
moments and social welfare. The transition to PT was also analysed using a second-order 
approximation. Details of the simulation procedure in this case are provided in section 5.2. 
5.1 Aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk 
The baseline results are reported in Table 2. Panel A concentrates on first and second 
moments under IT and PT, with the zero inflation risk case reported for completeness. Panel 
B reports the welfare cost of long run inflation risk in per cent of aggregate consumption, as 
well as the implied welfare gain from PT. 
Panel A indicates that the impact of PT is not uniform across young and old generations. PT 
raises average consumption by the young by 0.4 per cent relative to IT but lowers average 
consumption by the old by 0.2 per cent. Comparing consumption risk across regimes, old 
generations’ consumption risk (as measured by the unconditional variance) falls by more than 
one-tenth as a result of the reduction in long run inflation risk under PT, but there is an 
increase in consumption volatility for the young of just over 1 per cent. Given the magnitude 
of these impacts, PT has the net effect of raising aggregate (and hence lifetime) consumption 
and lowering aggregate consumption risk. Consumption by the young rises because the tax 
rate is lower under PT. That is to say, the government meets its long run government 
spending target with lower taxes than under IT, the reason being that PT essentially 
eliminates the inflation risk premium on nominal bonds, so that the average cost of issuing 
government debt is lower. Since taxes are lower under PT, the capital stock is higher on 
average by 0.8 per cent, and GDP by 0.2 per cent. Bond holdings are also higher, but only 
marginally. Average consumption by the old is higher under IT because the increase in the 
inflation risk premium raises the average real return on nominal government debt, and this 
increase dominates the negative income effect from the higher tax on capital income.
34
  
Turning to Panel B, the welfare cost of long run inflation risk is substantial at 0.35 per cent of 
aggregate consumption. Since PT largely eliminates long run inflation risk, the welfare cost 
falls to only 0.01 per cent, implying a permanent welfare gain of 0.34 per cent.
35
 There is an 
increase in social welfare under PT because it increases average consumption by the young 
and lowers consumption risk for the old. To investigate the relative importance of these two 
effects, the welfare gain was calculated in a log-linearized version of the model where risk-
premia are zero. In such a model PT has an impact on consumption risk but not on average 
consumption levels, since the average cost of issuing government debt is equalised across 
                                                          
34
 The annualised inflation risk premium is equal to 6 basis points under IT but only 0.2 basis points under PT, 
due to the dramatic reduction in long run inflation risk under a PT regime.   
35
 The standard deviation of inflation is equal to 0.104, or 10.4 per cent, under IT. Under PT, this figure is 
reduced to 0.027, or 2.7 per cent.  
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regimes, implying equal taxes. In the log-linearized economy the welfare gain from PT is 
equal to 0.08 per cent of aggregate consumption, indicating that around three-quarters of the 
total welfare gain is a result of lower taxes and only one-quarter the result of lower 
consumption risk (for any given level of taxes). Hence while the effects of PT on both 
average consumption levels and consumption risk are non-trivial from a welfare perspective, 
the impact on average consumption levels is more significant. These results clearly speak to 
the importance of non-linear approximations in models where inflation risk has important 
higher-order effects, as well as the potential importance accounting for the fiscal implications 
of alternative monetary policy regimes via the government budget constraint.    
Table 2 – Aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk 
Panel A: Aggregate effects under IT and PT 
 Zero Inflation 
Risk 
IT PT Percent change 
from IT to PT 
E(cY) 0.1838 0.1831 0.1838 +0.4% 
E(cO) 0.1858 0.1863 0.1859 –0.2% 
var(cY) × 1000 0.117 0.117 0.118 +1.2% 
var(cO) × 1000 0.146 0.165 0.147 –11.2% 
  0.1093 0.1112 0.1093 –1.7% 
Panel B: Welfare cost of long run inflation risk 
IT :  0.346 PT: 0.009 PT welfare gain: 0.337 
Notes: Panel A: units of the consumption good. Panel B: percent of aggregate consumption. 
 
5.2 The transition from IT to PT 
The long run analysis above abstracts entirely from the IT-to-PT transition and therefore 
ignores potentially important distributional and welfare effects of a change in regime. In this 
section, these effects are investigated. The analysis focuses on the impact of an unexpected 
transition to PT in period T on consumption levels and utility.
36
  
As can been seen from Figure 1, the effects of an unexpected transition from IT to PT in 
period T are short-lived: generations born in period T+2 or later are essentially unaffected by 
the transition, with consumption levels settling down at their long run average levels under 
PT (see Table 2). Consumption rises for the old alive in period T, since they benefit from a 
lower tax rate on capital income under PT, while the yield on nominal government debt is 
unchanged relative to the previous period because it reflects the expectation (held in period 
T–1) that an a IT regime would be in place next period, and therefore incorporates the same 
inflation risk premium as in a long run IT regime. Given that the current old generation 
consumes more under PT and is exposed to less consumption risk, their utility is somewhat 
                                                          
36
 20,000 separate transition paths were simulated using the second-order solution of the model given by 
Dynare++. The results were then averaged across stochastic simulations. Period T–1 is given by the final period 
of previous IT regime, conditional on the expectation that IT would continue with probability one in period T. 
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higher than under continuation of the IT, with a utility gain equivalent to 0.56 per cent of old 
age consumption.
37
 
Fig 1 – An unexpected transition to PT in period T 
 
Consumption also increases for the young alive in period T, since they benefit from a positive 
income effect from the lower tax on labour income under PT.
38
 However, this generation 
consumes less than young generations in subsequent periods and also loses out relative to the 
old generations in period T+2 or later. To this extent, the transition to PT has sizeable 
distributional consequences that would not be present under continuation of IT (where 
average consumption levels would equal their period T–1 values). The loss in lifetime utility 
for the young generation born in period T, relative to those young generations born in period 
T+1 or later, is equivalent to 0.13 per cent of their lifetime consumption. Crucially, however, 
the young of period T still have significantly higher lifetime utility than they would under 
continuation of IT, with an implied welfare gain of 0.22 per cent of lifetime consumption.  
In short, whilst an unexpected transition to PT has non-trivial implications for the distribution 
of consumption between current and future generations, these distributional effects are short-
lived and all generations directly affected by the transition can expect to gain utility as 
compared to continuation of IT. Consequently, accounting for the transition from IT to PT 
does not alter in any substantive way the conclusions of the long run analysis in section 5.1. 
The next section returns to long run issues in order to investigate whether PT is robust to 
extensions that relax crucial assumptions in the baseline case.       
6. Extensions 
This section investigates the robustness of the baseline results by assessing the implications 
of (i) a PT target horizon that exceeds one year, (ii) imperfect credibility of PT, and (iii) a 
government that holds taxes constant across monetary regimes but provides public goods that 
are valued by private agents. Each of these extensions is considered in turn. 
 
                                                          
37
 The utility of the old was calculated as 
  1 ,
1
, )1( OTOT cu  . 
38
 Since young generations both consume and save, some of the increase in disposable income is used to 
increase consumption and the remainder to purchase extra bonds and capital for old age. 
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6.1 A flexible target horizon under PT 
The case for a flexible regime that gradually restores the price level to its target path is made 
by Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007), who argue that the (short-term) costs of undoing price 
level shocks could be reduced in this way.
39
 To assess the impact of returning the price level 
to target gradually, the aggregate and welfare effects of PT are reconsidered in this section, 
with the target horizon in the PT money rule varying from one to eight years.  
For the case where the price level is returned to target in uniform steps over H years, 
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where, as previously, Mn is the end-of-period nominal money supply in year n.  
Note that innovations up to H years old enter in the denominator of this money supply rule 
because each is offset only after H years in total, with a fraction 1/H offset each period.  
By substitution, (25) implies the following money supply rule in period t: 
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where it has been assumed that the policy horizon H is less than 30 years.
40
   
Since the CIA constraint is binding, this equation implies that period t inflation is given by 
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The intuition for this expression can be seen by setting H = 2. In this case, only money supply 
shocks in years 29 and 30 of period t matter for inflation because shocks in years 1 to 28 will 
have been offset fully by the end of the period t (i.e. by year 30), given that the price level is 
returned to target in 2 years. Shocks in years 29 and 30 from the previous period enter in the 
denominator because these shocks will not have been offset before the end of period t–1 and 
must therefore be offset in period t in order to return the price level to its target path.  
Returning the price level to target gradually over H years raises long run inflation risk, 
because the price level is allowed to deviate from its target path for longer. In fact, the 
simulated unconditional standard deviation of inflation rises steadily with the target horizon, 
from a standard deviation of 0.027 (or 2.7 per cent) when H = 1, to 0.037 when H = 4, and 
0.048 when H = 8. By comparison, the unconditional standard deviation of inflation under IT 
                                                          
39
 Consistent with this argument, Smets (2003) finds that the optimal horizon for returning the price level to 
target is roughly double the optimal horizon for returning inflation to target in a New Keynesian model. 
40
 Note that the original money supply rule arises as a special case of this equation when H = 1. 
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is around 0.104 (or 10.4 per cent) in the baseline case.
41
 Hence, although long run inflation 
risk under PT rises steadily with the target horizon, it remains well below that under IT.  
Robustness of the aggregate effects of PT is investigated in Table 3. Each entry shows the net 
change relative to the baseline IT analysis for a given target horizon H, and the baseline case 
is reported in the first column. For instance, in the baseline case of H = 1 the consumption 
variance for old generations is reduced by 11.2 per cent under PT, compared to 10.8 per cent 
when H = 4, and 10.3 per cent when H = 8. The other results reported in Table 4 are even 
more robust. Overall, then, the aggregate effects of PT are strongly robust to changes in the 
target horizon for the price level target.    
Table 3 – Aggregate effects of PT as the target horizon H is varied 
 Target Horizon H (years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
E(cY) +0.42 +0.41 +0.41 +0.40 +0.40 +0.39 +0.39 +0.38 
E(cO) -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 
var(cY)  +1.2 +1.2 +1.1 +1.1 +1.1 +1.1 +1.1 +1.1 
var(cO) -11.2 -11.1 -11.0 -10.8 -10.7 -10.6 -10.4 -10.3 
τ -1.70 -1.69 -1.67 -1.65 -1.63 -1.61 -1.60 -1.58 
Note: entries are net impacts, expressed as percent changes relative to IT. Baseline case: H = 1. 
Fig 2 – The welfare gain from PT and the target horizon H 
 
The welfare gain from PT is also rather robust to changes in the target horizon (see Figure 2). 
As the target horizon is increased, the welfare gain from PT falls from 0.337 per cent of 
aggregate consumption when H = 1 (the baseline case), to 0.327 per cent when H = 4, and 
0.311 per cent when H = 8. The welfare gain falls because PT permits more long run inflation 
risk as the target horizon increases, so that the extent to which old generations benefit from 
reduced consumption risk is dampened. A rise in long run inflation risk also raises the 
inflation risk premium, so that taxes have to rise in order to meet the long run government 
                                                          
41
 These standard deviations refer to inflation over a 30-year horizon, not average annual inflation.  
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spending target. In turn, this increase in taxes lowers average consumption by young 
generations, albeit only marginally. The relationship between taxes and consumption by the 
young is evident from the first and final rows of Table 3. 
6.2 Imperfect credibility of PT 
The argument that a PT regime would be imperfectly credible is appealing given that a 
regime of this kind has never been adopted in practice. Consequently, imperfect credibility 
was an important factor in the Bank of Canada’s deliberations about whether to switch from 
IT to PT (see Bank of Canada, 2011). In the literature, the impact of imperfect credibility of 
PT has been assessed by Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2007) and Masson and Shukayev (2011).  
Gaspar et al. (2007) argue that PT is likely to experience an initial period of imperfect 
credibility when agents would learn about the workings of the new regime. They set up a 
New Keynesian model with learning and find that an initial period of imperfect credibility is 
sufficient to turn the net welfare gains from PT negative, if agents are slow to learn. The 
reason is that inflation expectations act as automatic stabilisers under a credible PT regime, 
but this link is weakened somewhat under learning, because expectations become backward-
looking. Masson and Shukayev (2011) build a New Keynesian model where PT operates with 
an ‘escape clause’, such that sufficiently large shocks lead to rebasing of the target price path. 
They show that there are two stable equilibria: one with a low probability of rebasing, and 
one with a high probability. They interpret the former as a PT regime with high credibility, 
and the latter as a PT regime with low credibility. In this environment, imperfect credibility 
reduces stabilization of supply shocks and is therefore costly for welfare.  
In contrast to these two papers, the analysis in this section concentrates on the impact of 
imperfect credibility through the long run inflation risk channel. The analysis also differs in 
that the model is non-linear, so that imperfect credibility influences aggregate outcomes 
through the inflation risk premium on nominal bonds, as well as via the inflation expectations 
channel. In order to model imperfect credibility, it is assumed that young agents believe there 
is a constant probability pIT that monetary policy will switch back to IT in the next period. 
Accordingly, agents believe with probability 1– pIT that the current PT regime will remain in 
place. This probability can be taken as a measure of credibility, with pIT
 
= 0 corresponding to 
the baseline case of perfect credibility.  
Given these beliefs over regimes s = {IT, PT}, agents’ lifetime utility function is given by 
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  is the expectation in regime s, conditional on period-t information Ωt.
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The first-order conditions are given by the following Euler equations:
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 See Ferman (2011) for a Markov-switching application in a model with Epstein-Zin preferences.  
43
 These first-order conditions are derived in full in section E of the Technical Appendix. The government is 
assumed to set the total bond supply so that the expected stochastic discount factor across regimes is equal to β. 
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where SDFt+1(s) ≡ sdft+1(s)/(1+πt+1(s)), 
k
s  is the tax rate on capital in regime s, and 
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To assess the impact of imperfect credibility, the model was solved for three different values 
of pIT, namely 0.5, 0.3, and 0.1. These values represent fixed beliefs that policy will revert to 
IT next period with 50 per cent, 30 per cent and 10 per cent probability and were chosen to 
represent situations of low, medium and high credibility, respectively. Table 4 reports 
aggregate effects relative to IT in these three cases, along with the implied welfare gain from 
PT and the baseline results. 
Table 4 – Aggregate effects of PT under imperfect credibility 
 Credibility of PT 
Perfect 
(Baseline) 
High 
(pIT = 0.1) 
Medium 
 (pIT = 0.3) 
Low  
(pIT = ½) 
E(cY) +0.42 +0.35 +0.25 +0.17 
E(cO) -0.22 –0.20 –0.16 –0.13 
var(cY)  +1.2 +0.8 +0.6 +0.5 
var(cO) –11.2 –11.4 –11.3 –11.1 
τ –1.70 –1.54 –1.22 –0.93 
PT welfare gain  0.337 0.287 0.198 0.129 
      Note: rows 1 to 5 are net effects, expressed as percent changes relative to IT. 
       The welfare gain in row 6 is measured in percent of aggregate consumption. 
The main impact of imperfect credibility is on young generations. With low credibility, 
average consumption by the young is only 0.17 per cent higher than under IT, as compared to 
0.42 per cent under perfect credibility. This reduction in average consumption for the young 
is driven by agents’ belief that policy could switch to IT next period, which raises the 
inflation risk premium on nominal government debt. Consequently, higher taxes are 
necessary for the government to meet its long run spending target, so that average 
consumption by the young falls due to the negative income effect. Imperfect credibility has 
relatively little impact on consumption risk for young and old generations because agents’ 
inflation expectation ‘errors’ are small given that expected inflation is similar under IT and 
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PT.
44
. Finally, under high credibility, aggregate effects are similar to under perfect credibility, 
as is the welfare gain from PT at 0.29 per cent of aggregate consumption. Hence a small 
degree of imperfect credibility does little to diminish the potential long run benefits of a PT 
regime. Overall, the welfare gain from PT is quite sensitive to imperfect credibility, but it 
remains non-trivial, reaching a minimum of 0.13 per cent in the low credibility case. 
6.3 Government spending on public goods 
A theme that has emerged from the analysis thus far is the importance of the accounting for 
fiscal effects of changes in monetary policy regime using general equilibrium analysis. The 
maintained assumption that the government sets taxes in order to meet a long run government 
spending target is, however, only one possible interpretation of fiscal neutrality, and the 
government is assumed to pursue this target despite government spending having no intrinsic 
value. In this section, an alternative type of fiscally neutrality is investigated: taxes are 
equalised across regimes but government spending has value because it enters private agents’ 
utility functions via spending on public goods. The aim is to determine whether the long run 
aggregate and welfare effects PT are robust to this change in specification. 
Consumer preferences are now given by 
            




 



 








1
1
1
1,1, )()(
1
1
 ),,( tOtttYtOYt hcEhchccu                    (34) 
where ht  ≡ χgt  + (1– χ)gt-1 is consumption services from public goods in period t.
45
  
The parameter θ is the relative weight given to public consumption in composite 
consumption, while 0 < χ < 1 indicates the extent to which current consumption services from 
public goods are dependent on past government spending. Lagged effects of public spending 
are included because the beneficial effects of spending on public goods are unlikely to be 
limited to current generations given that much spending of this kind is on durable goods such 
as museums, parks and hospitals. Each generation takes spending on public goods as given.  
To provide a quantitative assessment, the parameters χ and θ need to be calibrated. The 
relative weight on public consumption services was set at θ = 1/2, so that consumption 
services from public goods are given half the weight of private consumption in utility. The 
weight χ was set also equal to 1/2, implying that half of public consumption services received 
come from current public spending, with the other half coming from public spending in the 
previous period. The tax rate τ was set equal to 0.1112, its implied value under IT in the 
baseline analysis. The welfare gain in per cent of composite consumption is calculated using 
the same expression as in (13) and then converted to a percentage of private consumption by 
multiplying by the steady-state ratio of composite consumption to private consumption.  
Table 5 reports aggregate and welfare effects, including the implied welfare gain from PT. As 
taxes are equalised across regimes, mean consumption by the young is essentially identical 
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 Expected inflation is constant under IT and only varies under PT with the past yearly deviation from the target 
price path; see (18) and (23). 
45
 The specification for composite consumption is similar to Angelopoulos et al. (2012), though they work with 
CRRA preferences. First-order conditions for this case are derived in section F of the Technical Appendix. 
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under IT and PT, as compared to 0.4 per cent higher under PT in the baseline analysis. Mean 
consumption by the old remains lower under PT than IT, but the difference is larger than in 
the baseline analysis at 0.4 per cent (as opposed to 0.2 per cent), because old generations no 
longer benefit from lower taxes under PT. Turning to volatility, PT leads to a 10.0 per cent 
reduction in consumption risk for old generations (as compared to 11.2 per cent in the 
baseline model) and consumption risk for the young is essentially identical under IT and PT. 
Consequently, PT reduces consumption risk substantially for old generations and leaves 
private consumption risk essentially unchanged for the young. The final row of the table 
reports consumption services from public goods, h. Public consumption is higher under PT 
by 1.4 per cent because the average cost of issuing government debt is higher under IT due to 
the inflation risk premium, so that less government spending can be funded with a given tax 
rate. In summary, private consumption levels fall modestly under PT, but this fall is offset by 
a rise in public goods consumption and a substantial fall in consumption risk for the old. 
 
Table 5 – Aggregate and welfare effects when public goods enter utility 
Panel A: Aggregate effects under IT and PT 
 Zero Inflation 
Risk 
IT PT Percent change 
from IT to PT 
E(cY) 0.1820 0.1821 0.1820 -0.06% 
E(cO) 0.1860 0.1867 0.1860 -0.38% 
var(cY) × 1000 0.099 0.100 0.100 -0.02% 
var(cO) × 1000 0.179 0.200 0.180 -9.99% 
E(h) 0.055 0.054 0.055 +1.44% 
Panel B: Welfare cost of long run inflation risk 
IT :  0.111 PT: 0.018 PT welfare gain: 0.093 
   Notes: Panel A: units of consumption good. Panel B: percent of aggregate private consumption. 
Turning to welfare, the estimated long run welfare gain from PT falls to 0.09 per cent, which 
is just over one-quarter of the baseline value, but still non-trivial.
46
 Consequently, the main 
conclusion of the baseline analysis that there are non-trivial potential welfare gains from PT 
cannot be overturned, although the potential gains look somewhat lower. This result suggests 
that the baseline estimated welfare gain from PT should be treated with some caution. 
7. Sensitivity analysis 
This section consists of two parts. In the first, a parameter sensitivity analysis is conducted. 
The results assess the extent to which baseline results are sensitive to changes in individual 
calibrated parameters. In the second part, the model is roughly calibrated for Canadian 
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 The welfare gain from PT is quite sensitive to the calibration of the relative weight on consumption services 
from public goods, θ. For example, when θ = 3/4 the estimated welfare gain is 0.14 per cent of aggregate 
consumption, while if θ = 1/4 it falls to only 0.02 per cent.  
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nominal portfolios to assess the importance of the nominal portfolio channel. The model is 
then calibrated for Canadian price level shocks in order to provide an estimate of the welfare 
cost of long run inflation risk in Canada.  
7.1 Parameter perturbations 
This section investigates robustness of the baseline results to ‘high’ and ‘low’ calibrations for 
individual model parameters. The parameters tested are the risk aversion coefficient γ, the 
intertemporal substitution coefficient ε, the productivity innovation standard deviation σe, the 
productivity persistence parameter ρA, the share of indexed government bonds v, and the 
money supply innovation standard deviation σ. The calibrated values tested were γ = {10, 
20}, ε  = {–0.45, –0.25}, σe  = {0.051, 0.059}, ρA = {0, 0.40}, v = {0.10, 0.30} and  σ  = 
{0.0095, 0.0115}.
47
 These alternative calibrations represent symmetric deviations from the 
baseline case. The high value for ε implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.80, 
and the low value an elasticity of 0.69 (as compared to 0.74 in the baseline case).  
Aggregate effects of PT are reported in Table 6. Overall, the results are robust, but there is 
notable sensitivity with respect to the indexation share and the standard deviations of the 
innovations to productivity and the money supply. The reason is that these parameters 
determine the relative importance of real versus nominal risks. For example, with the high 
indexation share of 0.3, PT reduces old generations’ consumption risk by only 9.0 per cent, as 
compared to 11.2 per cent under the baseline calibration, because higher indexation reduces 
agents’ exposure to unanticipated fluctuations in inflation and therefore substitutes for the 
effects of PT. The results are also sensitive to the risk aversion coefficient, because the 
inflation risk premium – and hence the general equilibrium effects of PT – depend crucially 
on this parameter. However, none of the aggregate effects of PT changes sign, nor are any of 
the main quantitative findings of the baseline analysis overturned. 
Table 6 – Sensitivity of the aggregate effects of PT 
 
Parameter 
E(cY)          
High        Low 
case          case 
E(cO)            
High         Low 
case          case 
var(cY)          
High         Low 
case          case 
var(cO)          
High         Low 
case          case 
γ 
ε 
σe 
ρA  
v 
σ 
+0.56 
+0.43 
+0.42 
+0.41 
+0.33 
+0.50 
+0.27 
+0.41 
+0.42 
+0.42 
+0.52 
+0.34 
–0.30 
–0.23 
–0.22 
–0.22 
–0.18 
–0.26 
–0.15 
–0.21 
–0.22 
–0.22 
–0.27 
–0.18 
+1.4 
+1.2 
+1.2 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.3 
+0.9 
+1.2 
+1.2 
+1.2 
+1.4 
+1.0 
–11.7 
–11.2 
–10.1 
–9.6 
–9.0 
–13.2 
–10.6 
–11.2 
–12.7 
–11.9 
–13.6 
–9.3 
Baseline +0.42 –0.22 +1.2 –11.2 
         Note: entries are percentage changes relative to IT. 
Turning to welfare, Table 7 reports the welfare gain from PT for each sensitivity calibration. 
The welfare gain is strongly robust to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), 
productivity persistence, and productivity risk. It is quite sensitive, however, to risk aversion, 
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 The low indexation share of 0.1 is similar to the share of inflation-indexed bonds in marketable Treasury debt 
in the US (see Campbell et al., 2009), and the high indexation share of 0.3 is equal to the highest share that 
index-linked gilts attained in the UK government bond portfolio over the 1999 to 2010 period (see DMO, 2010). 
25 
 
the indexation share and the extent of nominal risk, being higher when indexation is low, and 
when risk aversion and nominal risk are high. For instance, raising the indexation share from 
0.2 to 0.3 lowers the welfare gain from PT from 0.34 per cent of aggregate consumption to 
0.26 per cent, while increasing the money supply innovation standard deviation to 0.0115 
raises the welfare gain from PT to 0.41 per cent and increasing the risk aversion coefficient to 
20 raises the welfare gain to 0.48 per cent. Again, however, there is not sufficient sensitivity 
to overturn any substantive conclusions from the baseline analysis. 
Table 7 – Sensitivity of the welfare gain from PT 
Parameter Role in model High case Low case 
γ 
ε 
σe 
ρA  
v 
σ 
Risk aversion 
EIS = 1/(1–ε) 
Std(prod. innov.) 
Prod. AR(1) coef. 
Indexation share 
Std (money innov.) 
0.481 
0.340 
0.341 
0.342 
0.262 
0.407 
0.207 
0.334 
0.333 
0.337 
0.421 
0.273 
Memo:  Baseline welfare gain = 0.337  
                              Note: entries are in percent of aggregate consumption. 
7.2 Canadian nominal portfolios 
In this section, the model is calibrated to roughly match Canadian nominal portfolios and the 
real side of the economy in Canada. This analysis acts as a check on the importance of 
nominal portfolios, since nominal retirement assets play a greater role than in the UK. The 
model is then calibrated for Canadian price level shocks in order to provide an estimate of the 
aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk in Canada.    
Meh and Terajima (2008) document nominal portfolios in Canada, based on data in the 
National Balance Sheet Accounts (NBSA) from 1990:1 to 2007:4 and the 2005 Survey of 
Financial Security (SFS), a household microdata survey collected by Statistics Canada. Meh 
and Terajima define four broad categories of nominal financial instruments: short-term 
instruments, bonds, mortgages, and employer pension plans. Here ‘bonds’ include non-
mortgage and non-pension nominal claims with a maturity exceeding one year, and 
‘pensions’ include defined contribution and defined benefit pension plans that are not fully 
indexed to prices. These nominal claims are classified as assets or liabilities for three sectors: 
the household sector, the government sector, and non-residents. Business sector portfolios are 
allocated to these three sectors based on ownership. 
Meh and Terajima find that the household sector’s net nominal position is substantial at 40.1 
per cent of GDP, due mainly to large net nominal positions in bonds and pensions of 22.1 per 
cent and 17.7 per cent of GDP, respectively. The distribution of government bonds by 
maturity in 2005 suggests that around three-tenths of government debt is held in bonds with 
maturities exceeding 15 years (see Fig 4 in the paper). Combining this share with the 
household net nominal position in ‘bonds’ gives an implied (upper bound) net nominal 
position in long-term government debt of about 6 per cent of GDP. Along with the net 
nominal position in pensions, the latter implies a net household position in long-term nominal 
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assets of around 24 per cent of GDP.
48
 The calibration below aims at a more conservative 
target ratio of nominal assets to GDP of one-fifth. 
OECD (2012) reports retirement income data for over-65s in Canada in the mid-2000s. The 
data suggest that public transfers are of similar importance to in the UK with an income share 
of around 45 per cent, and both occupational and private pensions and income from work 
have similar shares to the UK at 40 per cent and 13 per cent respectively. However, since 
around 60 per cent of private pensions in Canada are non-indexed defined benefit pensions 
(see Meh and Terajima 2008, Table A14), occupational and private pensions will be 
primarily nominal. Assuming such pensions are three-quarters nominal and one-quarter real 
(as opposed to the 50:50 ratio in the UK case), and that four-tenths of income received from 
public transfers is real (i.e. fully-indexed) and six-tenths nominal, implies a ratio of nominal 
to real retirement assets approximately two-fifths higher than in the UK, or around 1.4.
49
  
Turning to the real side of the economy, the investment-GDP ratio has been higher than in the 
UK over the IT period and was around 20 per cent in 2005. To strike a balance between the 
greater relative importance of nominal assets in Canada on the one hand and the higher 
investment-GDP ratio on the other, the calibration below aims at a target investment-GDP 
ratio of 0.175 and a target ratio of nominal to real assets of 1.2. The share of consumption in 
GDP in 2005 was slightly less than 60 per cent. On this basis, the target consumption-GDP 
ratio was set at 0.60. The target Sharpe ratio was left at 0.43.
50
   
Calibration  
Model calibration was based on a target ratio of nominal to real assets of 1.2, a share of long-
term government bonds in GDP of 20 per cent, an investment-GDP share of 17.5 per cent, 
and a target consumption share of 60 per cent. First, since indexed pensions are less prevalent 
in Canada and indexed government bonds have a lower share than in the UK, the indexation 
share was set at 0.14 (or 14 per cent), which is similar to the average share of indexed 
government debt from 2008 to 2012 (see Department of Finance, 2012). In order to roughly 
match the target ratios discussed above (subject to the calibrated indexation share), the ratio 
between wage and capital tax rates, a, and the production function coefficient α were allowed 
to vary. All other parameters were held at their baseline values. As in the baseline analysis, 
the government sets taxes to meet a long run government spending-GDP ratio of 11 per cent. 
A calibration that fits target ratios reasonably well is α = 0.250 and τk = 3.3τ (i.e. a = 3.3), 
implying a capital income share in GDP of one-quarter and a tax rate on capital 3.3 times as 
high as that on wage income. As can be seen from Table 8, the model performs reasonably 
well against target ratios.
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 By comparison, government debt was 43 per cent of GDP in 2005 (Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima, 2010; 645).  
49
 The two main public transfers to retirees in Canada, the Old Age Security pension and the Guaranteed Income 
Supplement, are indexed to prices (albeit with a lag). 
50
 The GDP shares cited were calculated using time series data available from Statistics Canada. 
51
 All ratios were calculated using deterministic IT steady-state values, with the exception of the Sharpe ratio. 
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Table 8 – Target versus model ratios: Canadian portfolios 
Ratio Target value Model value Definition 
(b
n 
+ m)/(k+ b
i
) 1.20 1.15 Nominal/real assets 
(b
n 
+ m)/y 0.20 0.15 Nominal assets/GDP 
b
i
/b 0.14 0.14 Indexation share 
i/y (=k/y) 0.175 0.113 Investment/GDP 
(cY + cO) /y 0.60 0.77 Consumption/GDP 
E[r
k–rf]/std(rk–rf) 0.43 0.33 Sharpe ratio 
 
Results 
Panel A of Table 9 reports moments of key variables under IT, PT and in the zero inflation 
risk case. The welfare cost of long run inflation risk and welfare gain from PT are reported in 
Panel B. The table reports two values in each cell: the first refers to the model calibrated for 
Canadian nominal portfolios only, and the second (in parentheses) refers to the calibration for 
both Canadian nominal portfolios and Canadian price level shocks during the IT period.
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The aggregate effects of PT are strengthened somewhat by moving to Canadian nominal 
portfolios. Most notably, consumption risk for old generations is reduced by almost one-fifth 
due to the greater importance of long run inflation risk when retirees hold a greater 
proportion of nominal assets. The greater importance of nominal portfolios increases the 
welfare cost of long run inflation risk under IT to 0.66 per cent of aggregate consumption. 
Consequently, the welfare gain from PT almost doubles to 0.64 per cent, indicating that the 
potential long run welfare gains from PT are likely to be somewhat higher if UK retirement 
portfolios shift toward the Canadian model where nominal bonds and non-indexed pensions 
are more prevalent. These results suggest that the aggregate and welfare effects of long run 
inflation risk will depend crucially on the structure of a country’s retirement portfolios – in 
particular the relative importance of nominal versus real assets. 
The results from the calibration for both Canadian nominal portfolios and price level shocks 
(see the figures in parentheses in Table 9) indicate that the aggregate effects of PT in Canada 
are likely to be similar to those in the UK. The reason is that the greater importance of the 
nominal portfolio channel in Canada is roughly offset by the lower magnitude of price level 
shocks in Canada over the IT period. Consequently, the estimated welfare gain is similar to 
that in the UK at 0.34 per cent. The potential long run welfare gains from PT are therefore 
likely to be broadly similar in the UK and Canada.  
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 In particular, the money supply innovation standard deviation was set equal to the standard deviation of the 
annual CPI in Canada over the period 1992-2011, or 0.008 (i.e. 0.8 per cent). Source: Statistics Canada website. 
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Table 9 – Aggregate and welfare effects with Canadian nominal portfolios 
Panel A: Aggregate effects of IT and PT 
 Zero 
Inflation Risk 
IT PT Percent change 
from IT to PT 
E(cY) 0.1879 0.1864 
(0.1871) 
0.1878 
(0.1878) 
+0.8 
(+0.4) 
E(cO) 0.1893 0.1898 
(0.1896) 
0.1893 
(0.1893) 
–0.3 
(–0.1) 
var(cY) × 1000 0.123 0.120 
(0.121) 
0.123 
(0.123) 
+1.9 
(+1.2) 
var(cO) × 1000 0.143 0.174 
(0.159) 
0.144 
(0.143) 
–17.5 
(–10.1) 
  0.1005 0.1034 
(0.1021) 
0.1006 
(0.1006) 
–2.7 
(–1.5) 
Panel B: Welfare cost of long run inflation risk 
IT:  0.661 (0.353) PT: 0.022 (0.012) PT gain: 0.639 (0.340) 
         Note: Entries in Panel A are net effects, expressed as percent changes relative to IT.  
           Entries in Panel B are expressed in percent of aggregate consumption. 
           Entries in brackets refer to the case of Canadian nominal portfolios and price level shocks.                                                          
8. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk under 
inflation and price-level targeting regimes. These two regimes have very different long run 
implications. Under inflation targeting, past inflationary shocks are ignored, so that that 
inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon due to base-level drift. With a price level 
targeting regime, by contrast, past inflationary shocks are reversed, so that the purchasing 
power of nominal assets is maintained over long horizons. These two regimes were analysed 
in a simple overlapping generations model that was roughly calibrated to match UK 
retirement portfolios. The model is well-suited for this task because long run inflation risk 
matters for social welfare and the distributional effects of the two regimes on young and old 
generations can be assessed directly.       
The aggregate and welfare effects of long run inflation risk are found to be substantial. Under 
IT, the welfare cost of long run inflation risk is equal to 0.35 per cent of aggregate 
consumption. Since a PT regime largely eliminates long run inflation risk, it reduces this 
figure to 0.01 per cent, implying a social welfare gain equivalent to a permanent increase in 
aggregate consumption of 0.34 per cent.  Price-level targeting raises social welfare because it 
reduces old generations’ consumption risk by around one-tenth, and raises average 
consumption by the young non-trivially. However, its aggregate effects are not 
unambiguously positive: the old consume less on average, and consumption risk rises 
marginally for young generations.  
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The above results are strongly robust to returning the price level to target gradually over 
several years, and formal analysis of unexpected transitions from inflation to price-level 
targeting does not overturn any substantive conclusions. However, an important finding is 
that a low degree of credibility of PT reduces the potential long run welfare gain from price-
level targeting by almost two-thirds, because the belief that policy may revert to inflation 
targeting (where the inflation risk premium is much higher) makes issuance of nominal 
government debt somewhat more costly than under perfect credibility. Consequently, taxes 
have to rise to maintain the same long run level of government spending, with a negative 
impact on lifetime consumption. The welfare gain from price-level targeting is also 
somewhat lower than in the baseline case if fiscal policy equalises taxes across regimes but 
provides public goods that enter private agents’ utility functions. These findings suggest that 
the estimates from the baseline analysis should be treated with some caution. 
Sensitivity analysis suggests that the welfare cost of long run inflation risk is likely to be 
substantially higher in economies with relatively little indexation and where risk aversion and 
nominal shocks are relatively high. The importance of nominal portfolios was assessed 
separately by calibrating the baseline model for portfolios in Canada, where nominal assets 
play a more important role than in the UK. Consistent with intuition, the welfare cost of long 
run inflation risk increased substantially, with the potential welfare gain from price-level 
targeting almost doubling. This result speaks to the importance of nominal portfolios for the 
transmission of inflation risk, suggesting that it is crucial to take this channel into account 
when comparing monetary regimes that have important implications for long run inflation 
risk. Lastly, calibrating the model with Canadian portfolios for price level shocks in Canada 
gives an estimated welfare gain similar to that in the UK case at 0.34 per cent, suggesting that 
the long run benefits from price-level targeting are likely to be broadly similar in these 
economies.    
Of course, the results of this study do not imply that price-level targeting will dominate 
inflation targeting overall, because the model abstracts from short-term stabilization issues. 
Rather, the paper provides formal evidence on the potential long run benefits of price-level 
targeting that should be considered in conjunction with previous work assessing stabilization 
at business cycle frequencies. However, to the extent that the aggregate and welfare effects 
reported are quantitatively significant, the analysis in this study clearly points to the potential 
advantages of accounting for long run effects of monetary policy regimes in future research.                    
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 TECHNICAL APPENDIX (Not for publication) 
A – Derivation of first-order conditions in the baseline model 
Consumers solve a maximisation problem of the form 
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The Lagrangian for this problem is as follows: 
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First-order conditions are as follows: 
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By substitution, this system can be reduced to four Euler equations: 
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The partial derivatives of the utility function are as follows: 
  )1(,
1
1
1
,1,
,





  


 








YtOttYt
Yt
t ccEc
c
u
                (A3) 
    






  
















OtOttOttYt
Ot
t ccEcEc
c
u
,1
1
)1(
1
,1
1
1
1
,1,
,1
)(               (A4) 
31 
 
Dividing (A4) by (A3) gives 
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  , the four Euler equations above can be written as follows: 
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~   . 
B – The binding cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint 
It is shown in this section that the CIA constraint binds with strict equality if the gross money 
return on a nominal bond exceeds 1.  
Proposition: The CIA constraint binds with strict equality when Rt > 1 
Proof. 
By equations (A7) and (A9), the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint is given by 
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Since the real return on a nominal bond is mtttt
n
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where Rt  is known at the end of period t. 
 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with μt are as follows: 
    0)(      and      0   ttt m                                         (B3)             
The second condition in (B3) is the complementary slackness condition. It implies that the 
CIA constraint will be strictly binding iff μt > 0 for all t.  
Dividing (B2) by ][][1 1111
m
tttt
n
ttt rsdfERrsdfE   , it follows that ttYtt RR /)1(,   .                                                                     
 
Since λt,Y > 0 (as the budget constraint of the young will always hold with equality), it follows 
that μt > 0 iff Rt > 1 for all t.      Q.E.D. 
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C – Approximate analytical expressions for long run inflation risk under IT and PT 
This appendix derives approximate expressions for the inflation variance under IT and PT. 
Inflation Targeting (IT) 
Under IT, inflation is period t is given by 
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j
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where εj,t are IID-normal innovations with mean zero and variance σ
2
. 
Since a general non-linear function g(ε) (where ε is a vector of variables) can be 
approximated by var(g(ε)) ≈ ∑[gj’(μ)]
2
var(εj) using the ‘Delta method’ (where μ is the 
unconditional mean of the vector ε, and gj’ is the first derivative of g(ε) with respect to 
variable εj), the inflation variance under IT can be approximated as follows: 
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Price-level targeting (PT) 
Under PT, inflation in period t is given by 
 
)1(
)1(
*)1(1
1,30
,3030



t
t
t


                                                              (C3) 
where ε30,t and ε30,t-1 are IID-normal innovations with mean zero and variance σ
2
. 
Using the same approximation method as above, the inflation variance under PT is given by 
 26022302230 2*)1(]*)1([]*)1[()var(  t                                (C4) 
Hence the unconditional variance of inflation under IT is (approx.) 15 times that under PT. 
 
D – Estimating the productivity innovation std. using productivity growth data 
Section 4.2 in the paper notes that the productivity innovation standard deviation is similar to 
the standard deviation of annual UK TFP growth from 1998-2010. This section provides a 
formal justification for calibrating in this way using growth data. 
It is assumed that annual productivity An  follows an AR(1) process in logs:  
 nnmeann eAAA  1lnln)1(ln                    (D1) 
where en is an IID-normal innovation with variance 
2
n . 
Annual productivity growth can be approximated by the first difference of (D1): 
  nnmeannnA eAAAAg   )ln)(ln1(lnln  11                                              (D2) 
33 
 
If annual productivity growth data is available, then 2n  can be estimated using 
 ))1(1)(var(ˆ 22   An g                  (D3) 
Therefore, if (ρ – 1)2 ≈ 0, the standard deviation of annual productivity growth will provide a 
good estimate of the standard deviation of the annual innovation to productivity. 
E – First-order conditions under imperfect credibility 
In this case, consumers solve the following problem where s = {IT, PT}: 
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where ]|[ )(1 tstXE   is the expectation of Xt+1 in regime s, conditional upon period-t 
information, Ωt. 
The Lagrangian for this problem is as follows: 
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First-order conditions are as follows: 
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By substitution, this system can be reduced to four Euler equations: 
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The partial derivatives of the utility function are as follows: 
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F – First-order conditions when public goods consumption enters the utility function 
In this case, consumers solve the following problem: 
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where consumption services from public goods received in period t, ht, is taken as given.  
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First-order conditions are as follows: 
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By substitution, this system can be reduced to four Euler equations: 
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Given that 1~ ,,  itit cc , the partial derivatives of the utility function are as follows: 
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Dividing (F4) by (F3),  
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